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ABSTRACT 
Cloud platform came into existence primarily to accelerate IT delivery and to promote 
innovation. To this point, it has performed largely well to the expectations of technologists, 
businesses and customers. The service aspect of this technology has paved the road for a faster 
set up of infrastructure and related goals for both startups and established organizations. This has 
further led to quicker delivery of many user-friendly applications to the market while proving to 
be a commercially viable option to companies with limited resources. On the technology front, 
the creation and adoption of this ecosystem has allowed easy collection of massive data from 
various sources at one place, where the “place” is sometimes referred to as just the cloud. 
Efficient data mining can be performed on raw data to extract potentially useful information, 
which was not possible at this scale before. Targeted advertising is a common example that can 
help businesses. Despite these promising offerings, concerns around security and privacy of user 
information suppressed wider acceptance and an all-encompassing deployment of the cloud 
platform.  
In this paper, we discuss security and privacy concerns that occur due to data exchanging hands 
between a cloud servicer provider (CSP) and the primary cloud user – the data collector, from 
the content generator, see Figure 1. We offer solutions that encompass technology, policy and 
sound management of the cloud service asserting that this approach has the potential to provide a 
holistic solution. 
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Figure 1- The cloud ecosystem 
INTRODUCTION 
Cloud-computing platform offers opportunities for developers to deploy mobile applications 
dynamically on a scalable on-demand hardware and software platform. It includes some unique 
features such as a complete end-to-end infrastructural solution with enough computation and 
storage resources as well as no maintenance responsibilities. All these features come considering 
the need for economies of scale by parties who wouldn’t be able to afford them otherwise. 
Companies like Salesforce, Oracle, Amazon, Google, and IBM have found this model lucrative 
and have created a cloud division within their respective organizations. Machine virtualization 
techniques have been deployed to provide flexible and cost-effective resource sharing for users 
both internal and external to the organization. This has encouraged individual developers and 
small size companies, like Dropbox, to create cloud platform orientated services and products 
that are interesting to the end user.  
However, data privacy concerns have thwarted the pace of its deployment. The user, who 
entrusts the CSP with personal data, is also expected extend this trust to third parties on matters 
related to its access. The platform thus acts like a “black-box” where the cloud service provider 
(CSP) is largely in control of gigabytes of user information. This information can range from 
highly sensitive to publicly available. Concerns are raised when parties that are interested in 
user-data analytics deploy artificial intelligence (AI) techniques, including machine-learning 
algorithms, to identify targeted audience for various purposes; advertisements being one of them. 
This has negatively influenced the mindset of data owners who are provided with no guarantees 
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by the CSPs that completely prohibit further usage of their data by anyone. Hence, it is difficult 
for the consumer to believe that the service provider will not share data covertly to a party 
outside of the original usage agreement.  
A strong enabler for preventing unauthorized access of information is encryption. It encodes data 
of all types into a format that is readable only to authorized parties. A suitable solution for this 
environment among all encryptions that serves the purpose of maintaining data privacy is 
homomorphic encryption1. Another similar mechanism called parallel homomorphic encryption 
(PHE)2 supports intensive computations via evaluation algorithms that can be efficiently 
executed in parallel. Encryption allows computation on encrypted data within the cloud without 
having the need to decrypt it, thus preventing exposure to those who have no legitimate need for 
data access. However, like many other strong encryption schemes, these protocols come with 
additional computational overhead of working on encrypted information. Although PHE is an 
improvement over homomorphic encryption in terms of faster computation, just like the 
homomorphic encryption, a lot of work is required to make it viable on a commercial scale.  
While a lot of technical research worth mentioning has been going on towards realizing a 
feasible full-proof solution for preventing unauthorized data access, we redirect the reader’s 
attention towards alternate ways of dealing with the problem. In this Article, we suggest a three-
pronged strategy to get a grip on this situation driven by– a) Technology, b) Internal Policy and 
Management, and c) State and Federal Policies. Our recommendation considers that while 
technology is a powerful agent in preserving data confidentiality in a cloud setup, it is 
insufficient in providing a complete solution unless backed by appropriate practices. A sound 
privacy assessment of the cloud also requires transparent pro-user management practices and 
internal policies such as: a) softwares that manage low-risk data cohabitate with those that have 
similar security needs; b) a blueprint of threat modeling of the cloud service - including software, 
hardware, and data; and c) a mechanism that addresses accountability concerns for protecting all 
data and control information that is used to grant access to the various parties. Lastly, we call for 
further exploration of external policies on both the state and federal level that offer limits and 
safeguards for the entire ecosystem. We submit these ideas in hopes to generate interest among 
                                                
1 Gentry, Craig. "Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices." In STOC, vol. 9, pp. 169-178. 2009. 
2 Kamara, Seny, and Mariana Raykova. "Parallel Homomorphic Encryption." In Financial Cryptography and Data 
Security, pp. 213-225. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. 
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policy makers, technologists, researchers and industry to consider as potential practical steps 
towards better data management. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A brief literature overview of the existing privacy and security concerns related to cloud platform 
is covered below. For this Article, we define the various players in the ecosystem as follows: A 
cloud service is rendered over a network and can be accessed remotely through the Internet. A 
cloud service provider (CSP) is the entity that provides the cloud solution - including application, 
hardware platform, storage and other resources. Using these resources is the data controller, 
which in our case is an entity who has access to end-users’ personal data of all kinds, in large 
quantities. This data may have been collected from the primary end-user either through 
applications installed on various personal digital devices or other means that collect user-
generated content like photos, videos, documents, etc. 
A Bird’s Eye View of Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing platform3 truly emerged as a consumer oriented computing paradigm in early 
2000s and soon became a popular technology. Increased bandwidth and flexible infrastructure 
comprising of a heterogeneous offering of softwares and hardware supported the increasing use 
of cloud services. It promised, and delivered, a computation environment to users with varying 
needs which later began to be distinguished as definitive service models (see Figure 2) – 
software-as-a-service (SaaS), platform-as-a-service (PaaS), and information-as-a-service (IaaS). 
Although there is no standard taxonomy defined, each model has been described below based on 
the most common features covered4,5,6: 
a. SaaS – All the application softwares running on a cloud infrastructure are offered to users’ 
on-demand under the SaaS model. Also refereed to as Application Service Provider 
                                                
3 Mell, Peter, and Timothy Grance. "The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, SP 800-145." NIST, Sept. 2011. 
Web. 
4 Takabi, Hassan, James BD Joshi, and Gail-Joon Ahn. "Security and Privacy Challenges in Cloud Computing 
Environments." IEEE Security & Privacy 8, no. 6 (2010): 24-31. 
5 Bent, Kristin. "The 20 Coolest Cloud Infrastructure, IaaS Vendors Of The 2014 Cloud 100." CRN. N.p., 31 Jan. 
2014. Web. 03 Sept. 2014. 
6 Popek, Gerald J., and Robert P. Goldberg. "Formal requirements for virtualizable third generation 
architectures." Communications of the ACM 17, no. 7 (1974): 412-421. 
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(ASP), its end-user gets access to these applications (apps for short) via a thin client or 
web-based interface on the user device. Some of the key providers are IBM, Salesforce, 
Oracle, and Microsoft. Cisco is steadily making inroads into application centric 
infrastructure for simplified software deployment. 
b. PaaS – Platform for building software applications is provided as a part of this service 
model. The developer, however, does not have access to underlying cloud services that 
may be modified using the interface. Microsoft’s Azure is an example of this. 
c. IaaS – In this model, computing resources such as processing, storage, and networks are 
provided to the user such that modifications can be made at the operating system and 
application level. Amazon Web Services (AWS) is the IaaS market leader with massive 
computational resources, aggressive pricing and an expansive product line. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Cloud service models and services provided 
The vastly different needs covered by these service models are actuated by virtualization which 
involves creating a virtual, efficient, isolated, duplicate version of cloud resources divided into 
multiple execution environments. This abstraction of resources is best made possible by 
technologies like hypervisor that create and run on virtual machines7. Other softwares such as 
Apache Hadoop allow large scale processing of data sets with a parallel, distributed algorithm on 
a cluster8. 
                                                
7 Seshadri, Arvind, Mark Luk, Ning Qu, and Adrian Perrig. "SecVisor: A tiny hypervisor to provide lifetime kernel 
code integrity for commodity OSes." ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review 41, no. 6 (2007): 335-350. 
8 Hadoop, Apache. "Hadoop." 2009-03-06]. http://hadoop. apache. org (2009). 
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The “anywhere, anytime” capability of the Internet ensures a truly global solution for the cloud. 
Its infrastructure can be deployed using one of the three models that are described below9: 
a. Private – The cloud provider is the only user of the infrastructure. Organization users have 
exclusive access to resources, which are located within the premises (physical or virtual) 
of the company. 
b. Public – A single organization provides multiple resources to multiple consumers, which 
is accessed via web-services over the Internet. The overall system is located on-site or off-
site which a third party provider may manage. 
c. Hybrid – It is a composition of two or more internal and external cloud providers that 
although are independent of each other, are bound by technologies that enable inter 
operability of data and applications. 
Privacy: The Fundamentals 
Privacy means many things to many people. As such, this social issue is often surrounded by 
debates asking: what is privacy and what does it mean. These questions are informed by different 
philosophical approaches and theoretical views of privacy’s value within a society. The most 
prominent of these is grounded in U.S. liberal political theory, which places the liberal self as 
one with the “capacity for rational deliberation and choice”.10 The liberal concept is further 
broken into two paradigms: positive and negative freedoms.11 The negative paradigm is best 
understood as an exercise of personal choice, which is manifested in the U.S. commitment to 
“notice-and-choice” information practices.12 Cohen denotes this approach as “principally 
defensive and ameliorative.”13 Allen, on the other hand, posits that privacy enables positive 
liberties such that one is free from “unwanted disclosures, publicity and loss of control of 
personality”.14  
                                                
9 Mell, Peter ,The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, 3. 
10Julie E. Cohen, “What Privacy Is For,” in Harvard Law Review (Vol. 126, 2013), 3. 
11 Ibid., 3.  
12 Ibid., 3. 
13 Ibid., 3. 
14 Anita L. Allen, “Coercing Privacy”, William & Mary Law Review, (40; 1999),  752. 
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From these concepts, multiple theories have emerged that explain privacy in relation to: 
autonomy, personhood, secrecy, liberty, etc. Warren and Brandeis, in their seminal article, The 
Right to Privacy, set forth the notion of privacy as a “right to be let alone”.15 In addition, their 
article outlined support for enforcement through use of tort damages, which has since heavily 
influenced case law. Others view privacy as accessibility to information about another person;16 
while, some refer to the harms necessary to understand privacy violations.17 In 1960, William 
Prosser’s article, Privacy,18 analyzed hundreds of privacy cases, which informed the development 
of four categories within privacy tort law. These include: “1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s 
seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; 2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts 
about the plaintiff; 3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and, 4) 
appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness”.19 While this 
work has served as a cornerstone for most modern privacy scholars, critiques of its rigidness and 
utility in context of information technologies have some questioning the need for revisions. More 
recent, Cohen offers a more post-liberal view that emphasizes the importance of recognizing a 
spectrum of relational and emerging subjectivity within a theory of privacy.20  
In 1973, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare introduced the Fair Information 
Practices (FIPs)21. This set of defined principles has since helped inform how to evaluate and 
design systems that may impact individual privacy rights. This framework includes guidance on 
transparency, individual participation, purpose specification, data minimization, use limitation, 
data quality and integrity, security and accountability & auditing.22 As Schwartz notes, whenever 
information refers to an identified person, all FIPs principles should be applied - an argument he 
later complicates with the introduction of identifiable data.23 International adoption of FIPs is 
apparent within certain areas of the EU’s data protection plan, which include (but is not limited 
                                                
15 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, Harvard Law Review, (4; 1890).  
16 Allen, Coercing Privacy, 4.  
17 Daniel J. Solove. The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age, (2007). 
18 William L. Prosser, Privacy, California Law Review, (48; 1960), 389.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Cohen, What is Privacy For, 5.  
21 U.S. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens (50; 1973). 
22 National Institute of Standards. “National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace: Appendix A - Fair 
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs)”. < http://www.nist.gov/nstic/NSTIC-FIPPs.pdf>  accessed 29 Aug. 2014.  
23 Paul M. Schwartz. “Information Privacy in the Cloud”. Univ. of Penn. Law Review. vol. 161 at 1654. 
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to) the presence of an independent data protection authority and limits on automated decision 
making.24  
In the U.S., the legal regime assumes various, complex approaches to address privacy concerns. 
It should be noted that unlike the EU, the United States does not have an omnibus information 
privacy statute. Instead, legal instruments, such as torts, statutes and case law, are instantiated on 
the state, federal, and international levels. On the constitutional level, privacy issues challenge 
protections afforded by the First and Fourth Amendments. In particular, critics of regulating data 
collection cite that such policies interfere and impede information flows, thus conflicting with 
the First Amendment.25 For example, in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. (2011), the Supreme Court 
struck down (in a 6 to 3 decision) Vermont’s prescription law26. The court held that the Vermont 
statute, which bars disclosure of prescription of data for marketing purposes, violated the free 
speech rights of the data-mining firms. The court determined that the prescriber-identifiable data 
was not fully protected speech, but instead, commercial speech; and, therefore, could not be 
restricted based on the Central Hudson scrutiny test.27 
In cases of the Fourth Amendment, privacy issues arise in defining a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy”28 and the need for a warrant to protect against unreasonable search and seizure by the 
government. Most notably, the Electronic Communications Protection Act (ECPA)29 has recently 
resurfaced in Congress due in large part to increasing criticism of its outdated and insufficient 
alignment with modern technologies.30 Comprised of three separate federal statues - the Stored 
Communications Act, the Pen Register Statute, and the Wiretap Act - its original intent was to 
                                                
24 Ibid., 1636.  
25 Solveig Singleton, Cato Policy Analysis No. 295. “Privacy as Censorship:A Skeptical View of Proposals to 
Regulate Privacy in the Private Sector.” <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1154>, last accessed 28 
Aug. 2014.  
26 “Act Relating to Increasing Transparency of Prescription Drug Pricing and Information”, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 
4631 (2007), ("Vermont Statute”). 
27 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm. of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). (commercial 
speech can be limited if: 1) truthful and non-misleading; 2) is in support of a substantial government interest; 3) 
directly advances the government interest asserted; and 4) is not more extensive than necessary to serve that 
interest). 
28 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
29 Electronic Commc’n Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510—
2522, 2701—2712 (2006)). 
30 Center for Democracy & Technology. “Updating ECPA.” <https://cdt.org/campaign/updating-ecpa/>. last 
accessed 28 Aug. 2014. 
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expand Fourth Amendment protections in light of emerging computer technologies, like e-mail. 
Unfortunately, technology has evolved substantially over the last decade making the Act 
irrelevant and ill suited as a governing protocol. We discuss further implications of the ECPA as 
it relates to cloud services in the next section. 
Additional federal consumer privacy laws focus narrowly on types of records within specific 
industries.31 The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)32 in 1970 and the Family Educational Rights 
and Privacy Act (FERPA)33 in 1974 were among the earliest federal statutes introduced in the 
United States. Since then, privacy laws have followed a traditional model that is reactive and 
measured “in terms of the value of preventing harm to an individual”.34 Examples include the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA); the Health Information Portability and 
Accessibility Act (HIPAA); and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). These federal statues 
echo the FIPs framework in identifying potential risks for personally identifiable information 
(PII). Take for example COPPA (effective April 2000), which imposes limitations on the types 
of information that maybe collected from children under the age of thirteen. Additional 
provisions include parental notification and consent; the availability of a clear and detailed 
privacy policy by the Web site operator; and an opportunity for a parent to review any 
information collected by the website about his/her child.35 Proponents, like EPIC, urged its 
adoption as a safeguard to prevent tracking and profiling of children online. Jeff Chester, 
executive director of the Center for Digital Democracy commented of the policy,  
“This proposal balances the need to protect the privacy of children, ensure parental 
involvement, and promotes the growth of kid-oriented online media.  At a time when our 
children spend much of their daily lives online and are always connected to the Internet 
                                                
31 Jay P. Kesan, Carol M. Hayes, and Massoda N. Bashir, “Information Privacy and Data Control in Cloud 
Computing: Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market Efficiency”. Washington & Lee Law Review, (70; 2013), 
http://http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol170/iss1/6 , last accessed 27 Aug. 2014, 365. 
32 15 U.S.C. § 168b (2006).  
33 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 CFR Part 99 (2006).  
34 Daniel J. Solove, “Identity Theft, Privacy and the Architecture of Vulnerability”, Hastings Law Journal, (54; 
2003), 5.  
35 EPIC. “COPPA’s Provisions”. http://epic.org/privacy/kids/, last accessed 28 Aug. 2014. 
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via games, cell phones and other devices, parents should thank the FTC for acting 
responsibly on behalf of children.”36 
However, COPPA is not without its critics. Specifically, the provision wherein an operator must 
obtain veritable parental consent was seen by many as a “costly, cumbersome, and inadequate in 
protecting personal information”.37 Others go further criticizing COPPA’s limitations on 
children’s right to freedom of speech and self-expression. Of late, the FTC has made significant 
strides in enforcing COPPA by imposing large fines against companies like Disney’s Playdom 
(fined $3 million)38; Xanga (fined $1 million)39; and Path, a mobile social networking app 
(settled for $800,0000).40 
State-level statues to protect consumer data also run the gamut. In some cases, state level 
protections of privacy are codified within state constitutions, which expressly recognize privacy 
as a right (e.g. Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina 
and Washington).41 According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), at least 
30 states have enacted laws that specify how entities handle PII collected by businesses and 
governments. These laws include requirements on how to destroy and dispose of PII as well as 
security breach notification laws and identity theft statutes. In 2013, California enacted the   
Privacy Rights for California Minors in the Digital World (SB 568)42, permitting users under the 
age of 18 to delete or remove content posted online (effective January 1, 2015). According to the 
bill, website operators must permit a minor who is a registered user to either remove or request 
                                                
36 Center for Digital Democracy. Jeff Chester. “Children's Privacy Advocates Praise FTC on Proposed Safeguards 
to Protect Children's Information Online.” 15 Sept. 2011, <http://democraticmedia.org/childrens-privacy-advocates-
praise-ftc-proposed-safeguards-protect-childrens-information-online> last accessed 29 Aug 2014.  
37 EPIC, “Criticisms of COPPA”. http://epic.org/privacy/kids/, last accessed 28 Aug. 2014.  
38 Chloe Albanesius, “Disney’s Playdom Fined $3 Million for Violating Kids’ Privacy”. PC Magazine. 16 May 
2011.< http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2385444,00.asp> last accessed 28 Aug 2014.  
39 Pete Cashmore. “Xanga Fined $1 Million for Violating Children’s Privacy”. website: mashable.com < 
http://mashable.com/2006/09/07/xanga-fined-1-million-for-violating-childrens-privacy/>. 7 Sept. 2006, last 
accessed 27 Aug. 2014.  
40 FTC. “Path Social Network App Settles FTC charge it deceived consumers and improperly collected personal 
information from users’ mobile address books”. 1 Feb 2013. < http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/02/path-social-networking-app-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived> last accessed 28 Aug. 2014.  
41 National Conference of State Legislatures. “Privacy Protections in State Constitutions”. 11 December 2013. 
<http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-state-
constitutions.aspx>. last accessed 26 Aug. 2014.  
42 California Law. Senate Bill-568; Chapter 336 
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removal of information posted on their site under the “eraser” provision outlined in Section 
22581.43  
Given the amount of regulatory provisions available, one could conservatively argue that privacy 
issues in the U.S. are diminishing. However, despite these numerous legal layers, information 
privacy remains at risk of being compromised.44 Schwartz notes that such shortcomings are a 
result of the law’s static nature and inadequate incentives for the multiple parties who manage 
and store personal data to provide appropriate security and privacy protections.45 We go further 
to suggest that the current use of sectoral laws and its narrowly applied approach leaves 
significant gaps in regulating highly distributed, modular technologies, like cloud services.46 
Complicating Privacy Policies and the Cloud 
As we’ve outlined above, state, federal and international information privacy policies vary on 
many different levels. Yet, they all share in the difficulty of keeping pace with technology 
advancements. Fast forward and legal issues of regulating cloud services are already emerging. 
Kesan, et. al distill current legal issues into two categories in context of cloud computing: data 
use and procedural issues.47 Data use includes (but is not limited to) scraping or mining of data, 
use of public or private information, and the transfer of data. Kesan notes that in most data 
collection instances, privacy protection is unclear due to unsettled notions of whether it should 
prioritize the quantity of data or types of data.48 Schwartz pushes further suggesting that changes 
in personal data processing have challenged traditional notions of jurisdiction, definitions of 
personal identifiable information, and contract law.49 He identifies three areas of change in 
personal data processing due to cloud technologies: 1) nature of information processing as 
increasingly international; 2) multidirectional nature of modern data; 3) process-oriented 
                                                
43 Ibid. 
44 Identity Theft Resource. 2013. (reported nearly 58 million records were compromised)  
45 Schwartz, Information Privacy and the Cloud, 1624.  
46 Ibid,, 1649. 
47 Kesan, Information Privacy and Data Control, 365. 
48 Ibid., 367 
49 Schwartz, Information Privacy and the Cloud, 1628-1632. 
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management approach, which outsources computing processes in exchange for specialization of 
service.50 
As an example of the tensions between the current legal regime and cloud services, we turn our 
attention back to ECPA, specifically the Stored Computer Act (SCA) section. When the U.S. 
Congress enacted ECPA and SCA in 1986, it did so notably within the context of its own 
technological perspicacity. Kattan summarizes,  
“as originally enacted, the SCA attempted to balance the interests of law enforcement 
against individual privacy rights by dictating the mechanisms by which the government 
could compel a particular service provider to disclose communications stored on behalf 
of its customers.”51  
Sections §2702 and §2703 of the SCA specifically address when and why providers may 
voluntarily disclose information to others and ways in which the government may compel a 
provider to disclose information, respectively.52 The SCA also identifies two types of services: 
electronic communication services (ECS) and remote computing services (RCS).53 This 
differentiator is key in determining whether certain communications are in “electronic storage” 
versus just in “storage”.54 Orin Kerr offers three reasons that challenge the notion of why strong 
privacy protections online may not extend to the “virtual homes” in cyberspace.55 First, he speaks 
directly to expectations of privacy online and the role of third-parties like Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs); second, pertains to the rules governing grand jury subpoenas; and third, 
recognizes ISPs as private actors, which means that strong protections are not extended under the 
Fourth Amendment.56  Whether cloud service providers (CSPs) presumably fall under the RCS 
category or are identified as private actors (like ISPs) remains unclear under the current Act and 
its language. For e-mail service, which may be “stored” on the cloud, the government would need 
                                                
50 Ibid.  
51 Ilana R. Kattan, “Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored Communications Act Fails to Protect the Privacy 
Communications Stored in the Cloud”, Vanderbilt Journal of Ent. & Tech. (617; 2011).  
52 Ibid., 401.  
53 Stored Communications Act. 18 U.S.C. § § 2703(a)–(b).(2006) 
54 Kesan, Information Privacy and Data Control, 403. 
55 Orin S. Kerr, “A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It”, 
George Washington Law Review, (72; 2004), 3. 
56 Ibid., 4-5.  
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only a subpoena to compel the sharing of such information. Thus, organizations like Digital Due 
Process have urged Congress to reform ECPA and SCA in order to preserve civil liberties asking 
that probable cause be established and a warrant issued prior to government intrusion.  
More perplexing legal issues surface when data is transferred across servers, state lines, and 
internationally. Kesan writes that the question over jurisdiction of data on the cloud surfaces due 
to “(1) the lack of borders in cyberspace; and (2) the vast differences between privacy laws in 
different locations”.57 In the United States, information privacy law does not provide government 
officials with the authority to block international transfers of personal information. It also does 
not offer any laws to regulate the processing of information unless specifically forbidden by law 
or regulated through other parameters.58 Because of these jurisdictional challenges, the Terms of 
Service agreements between CSPs and their customers carry the burden of outlining where the 
data is stored and which laws apply.59  
To illustrate the complexity of jurisdiction in context of cloud service providers, we turn to the 
ongoing litigation over whether Microsoft must comply with a warrant authorizing the search 
and seizure of email accounts hosted by the company.60 Since 2013, Microsoft has objected to 
the warrant citing that the U.S. courts are not authorized to issue warrants for “extraterritorial 
searches”. Defined in Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd., the doctrine holds that 
“legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”61 In this case, Microsoft’s argument hinges on the 
physical location of the data (stored in Ireland); while the government’s rebuttal reasons that 
Microsoft is subject to U.S. jurisdiction and, therefore, where the data is stored is irrelevant. 
Recently affirmed by Judge Loretta A. Preska of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York, the decision highlights unresolved tensions over jurisdiction due to conflicting 
international privacy law and technology outpacing policymaking. Moreover, as Kuner astutely 
                                                
57 Ibid., 368-369. 
58 Schwartz, Information Privacy and the Cloud, 1636-1637. 
59 Kesan, Information Privacy and Data Control, 369. 
60 Christopher Kuner. “U.S. Warrants for Overseas Data Trample Foreign Privacy Laws”. MIT Technology Review.  
22 Aug. 2014 <http://www.technologyreview.com/view/530316/us-warrants-for-overseas-data-trample-foreign-
privacy-law>, last accessed 26 Aug 2014.  
61 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010) 
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points out, this particular discourse lacks any insight for potential safeguards for the consumers 
and users of services, like Microsoft’s email application.62 
As cloud services grow, it is evident that current legal standards and regulations will need to be 
reformed. For some, to do so may require both legislative and FCC action.63 Others suggest 
increased transparency by cloud providers as one solution. More importantly, such reform will 
require advancement in our conceptualization of privacy that does not exclude context and 
structure of contemporary data management flows. To address this, we offer additional 
perspectives in the upcoming section that move towards a fuller understanding of privacy issues 
within current cloud offering.  
 
PUTTING IT TOGETHER: SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONCERNS IN THE CLOUD 
In this section, we discuss security and privacy concerns that have significantly affected the 
deployment of cloud platform. 
Unauthorized Data Sharing 
Multi-tenancy is a part of the public or community cloud offering with the ability to roll out 
services to multiple users simultaneously. This supports reduced overhead and higher availability 
of applications for the provider through solutions management. As an instance, the ZFS storage64 
capabilities along with hypervisors, offers customized solutions down to choosing the software 
version, thus encouraging a modular and parallel approach. Takabi et el., further elaborate that 
among the unique features of the cloud, is its ability to manage resource utilization efficiently by 
offering a partitioned virtualized space for every customer subscribed to the service. This multi-
tenancy is partially responsible for bringing the overall cost of the infrastructure down, which is 
why it is a great provision on behalf of the provider. 
At one point during the cloud’s market growth, multi-tenancy was driven by technology available 
at the time. Multi-tenancy architecture was accessible at the application level. Since then, several 
large companies have driven a major innovation wave in the cloud space leading to mature 
                                                
62 Kuner, U.S. Warrants. 
63 Kevin Werbach, “The Network Utility”, Duke Law Journal 1761 (60; 2011). 
64 "Oracle ZFS Storage Software." Oracle. Accessed September 3, 2014. 
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technology in the hardware, software, and virtualization space. Hence, multi-tenancy in the same 
storage space is no more a means of true cost reduction. An upgrade from this solution is, 
however, not a priority with some of the companies, including Oracle65. The need to move to 
anything has been found unwarranted and opposing business value. While saving enormous 
amount of money, time and human resource in creating the infrastructure from scratch is clearly 
an attractive offer, profit making is still the primary goal. However, prioritizing profits over the 
quality of product wouldn’t allow sustainability for too long. As a customer, allowing ones data 
to reside on a multi-tenant platform poses several privacy and security related challenges. We 
discuss some of these challenges shortly. 
Another big privacy concern is data being accessed by the service provider itself. The rationale is 
straightforward; there is a huge demand for data of all kinds in the Internet community. Many 
companies earn their livelihood by analyzing this data and selling it to interested parties at 
profitable rates. Platform owners usually have access and control over data inhabiting in any part 
of the platform, and they may take advantage of being in this unique position. If big-data 
analytics has given data controllers the power to extract interesting analysis from the datasets, it 
has also increased avenues of privacy violations. The rationale behind using cloud as a service 
comes understandably from reduced setup and operational costs, increased computational 
performance, elastic scalability, etc. This has been made possible by various service models 
including software (SaaS), platform (PaaS), and infrastructure (IaaS) that are offered through 
convenient and affordable pricing models.  
The current technological barriers focus only on providing security measures in the conventional 
sense. Some of these are described in the following section. 
Cloud Platform Related Attacks 
CSPs66 are the current favorites of cyber criminals, and we can expect to see more sophisticated 
attacks emerge in the future. They attract cybercriminals just as robbers are attracted to banks. A 
database located in the cloud is similar to an information bank with many customers, and 
cybercriminals are interested in using this data malevolently or in other unauthorized ways. 
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Accessed September 3, 2014. 
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Therefore, attacking a cloud service provider exposes entirely new and unconventional family of 
attack surfaces on the platform. These vulnerabilities and those implicit to other components of 
the infrastructure lead to many security gaps that adversaries can deploy in their favor. As an 
effort to thwart the efforts of the adversary or attacker, the security expert can take several 
measures. 
The security personnel should understand attacks that are specifically geared towards the cloud 
platform. It is possible to shoulder the responsibility of securing the system on someone with 
experience in protecting enterprise network. There is definitely a basic skill that both should 
possess – the ability to configure, design and break security of systems.67 Certifications from 
Cloud Security Alliance, Microsoft, Cisco, SANS and many other certification providers help a 
lot in getting hands-on experience by means of laboratory sessions and theory classes. These 
certifications usually provide satisfactory understanding of how various security systems work, 
the common attacks and protection mechanisms. This understanding can be applied safely to 
many systems and can also be upgraded as technology advances. Various blogs, threat reports by 
security firms and other organizations can keep one current with new threats on the horizon. 
Enough detail is provided about each threat and that progressively enhances the knowledge base 
of the evolving threats landscape. Below is an example of a malware threat seen on a security 
blog recently: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3- Example of a worm description68 
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September 3, 2014. 
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Using similar skills and a sound understanding of the cloud infrastructure, a security personal 
may feel sufficiently equipped against known threats. The attack scenarios do not, however, 
completely overlap in the two environments. 
We can write countless papers if one were to cover existing and potential attacks implicit to 
cloud platforms. But, our goal is to take a systemic approach and provide mechanisms to protect 
the overall infrastructure instead of just focusing on safety measures through security related 
approaches. Our approach is novel because it explores pragmatic ways to inform the primary 
user of the system’s capability to store data securely and in a measurable way. We recognize that 
the complexity of these attacks will increase as the systems continue to evolve and provide 
increased functionalities. Heterogeneity of constituent systems and softwares binding them will 
also increase overall attack surfaces. With this evaluation, we propose our solution in the next 
section. 
 
MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS 
Cloud security implementers are in a prime position to develop privacy-preserving technologies 
to protect unlawful access of data. This is the foremost step to gain data controllers’ trust for 
sharing data with CSPs. But, it does not offer a full proof solution guaranteeing privacy and 
security of all data. Much is dependent on the environment the solution is implemented in. A 
strong data encryption technique will protect the data from certain type of malicious intentions 
and approaches. There are other facets of illegal data access that necessitate new ways of 
protection.  
Our thesis revolves around the idea of binding the distinct approaches of a technologist, a policy 
maker and a business owner into a combined, cohesive perspective through a secure service. 
Each dimension brings a critical assessment to the table but cannot guarantee a complete solution 
individually. In this section, we will evaluate each approach separately. Later, we propose a 
unified cohesive solution in the form of a big picture.  
The Technologist’s Approach  
Users of cloud services usually range from individual software application developers to small 
business owners who at least have a few thousand customers. Large corporations can also be 
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seen taking advantage of the cloud to offload, conservatively speaking, part of their system. As 
mentioned in the Article earlier, cloud-computing infrastructure is still maturing and much work 
needs to be done on several frontiers, security and privacy of data being one of them. If proper 
data protection is not guaranteed for users, loss and exposure will ensue even in a protected 
premise.69 In light of the data privacy related attacks we discussed in the previous section, we 
recommend performing a threat analysis of the overall system as a mandatory exercise. As we 
explain later, the mandate must be one assumed by the company itself and not instigated from a 
public policy side.  
System changes configuration with each addition or removal of a hardware or software object. 
With the elasticity of resources that a cloud provides, a comparative threat analysis with each 
major upgrade will definitely offer key insights into gaping security holes and new privacy 
concerns resulting from the change. Before we discuss the performance of a security threat 
analysis,70 we first need clarity of its meaning. A commonly accepted definition of threat, factors 
that create threat to a system, and ways of measuring different types of threat will be 
advantageous in delivering effective assessment results. For the purpose of this Article, we 
define a threat as “anything that is capable of acting in a manner resulting in harm to an asset 
and/or organization; for example, acts of God (weather, geological events, etc.); malicious 
actors; errors; failures.”71 
This clarification will eliminate a huge possibility of unforeseen incidents, as its impact has been 
realized and remedies planned in advance. It is often useful to define many separate threat 
models for a given system. Each model defines a narrow set of possible concerns to focus on. In 
the case of cloud services, possibilities of both security breach and un-handled privacy need to be 
modeled. This exercise can help to assess the probability, the potential ways of harm, the 
significance given to stored data, of attacks, and thus help limit customer concerns.  
Threat Modeling has the potential to become an integral part of the process where privacy and 
security are relevant concerns. Some of the questions that need to be answered are: 
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1. What types of attacks need to be modeled in a cloud environment?  
2. What does threat modeling mean for a cloud platform? 
3. What tools and technologies can be used to accomplish the modeling task? 
4. Will threat modeling help in creating an insurance plan when a data breach takes place? 
5. How to share the threat model with the customer in a readable format? 
There are some existing tools that can be used to perform threat modeling for any asset that 
needs protection. Bruce Schneier developed attack trees72, which is a way of thinking and 
describing security of systems and sub-systems. A list of possible attack vectors is created for the 
entire system that helps make decisions about how to improve security. 
The usability of threat modeling can be maximized if the security architect thoroughly 
understands the architecture of a general public cloud platform. Although individual cloud-based 
platforms offer a broad spectrum of technologies and services, this in no way should hamper the 
impact this systemic analysis will have on appraisal of existing security gaps and hence proposed 
solutions.  
Another proposed solution is to cohabitate data with same level of sensitivity and privacy needs. 
This first requires classification of the various user data into pre-defined sensitivity levels. These 
levels can be based on existing Federal or state defined policies, cost incurred in case of a data 
loss or can even be user designated. The ToS document can outline this agreement between the 
service provider and user. This proposition has the potential to increase trust on management of 
privacy that safeguards databases with critical data. More resources can be deployed specifically 
for these systems as opposed to system-wide implementation of stronger security. To further 
reduce ambiguity, privacy and security concerns around data can be defined bearing the 
following points in mind-  
a. Definition of data that needs protection  
– Who owns the data (individual/organization)? 
– What information does the data contain? 
b. Financial implications associated with data theft, unauthorized access or loss. 
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c. Impact on owner of the data if a third party accesses the data in an unauthorized way?  
d. Federal or state imposed restrictions on access of that data 
e. Time period for which the sensitivity of the data is maximum 
f. To elaborate further, some of the examples are - Is the information related to a person’s 
health records, contains sensitive information like social security number, passport 
number, driver’s license or similar that can serve as unique identification of a person? 
Does the information pertain to banking account? More similar questions, if asked, can 
make the service provider informed of the appropriate services needed for the data to be 
stored and protected. 
Policymakers Approach 
In this Article, we examine privacy concerns and security protections of consumer data afforded 
by cloud technologies, public policies and internal data management practices. As we’ve 
advocated throughout the Article, a successful and secure cloud solution requires the integration 
of all three elements. Kesan et, al. recommend the introduction of a baseline of privacy 
protections that identify minimum requirements in order to protect sensitive information and a 
provision to identify risk of loss for online fraud.73 They also call for strong enforcement and 
regulation of data control (e.g. data mobility, data withdrawal, secondary-use, etc.)74 Echoing 
Kesan, we too believe that a baseline of protections would help provide consistent structure 
across the patchwork of U.S. privacy policies. In regards to personal data control, we remain on 
the fence for two reasons. First, usable technical mechanisms that enable such control on the 
user/customer level remain elusive. Second, studies indicate that personal control of data may 
not elicit rational behavior or good decision making by the user.75 We also draw from Solove’s 
challenge that “emerging privacy problems must be understood ‘architecturally’ as part of a larger 
social and legal structure. Consequently, protecting privacy must focus not merely on remedies 
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and penalties but on shaping architectures.”76 Thus, it is in identifying how each element 
compliments and or detracts from the other that a comprehensive solution emerges.  
As indicated previously, one critical weakness of U.S. privacy law and regulation is the lack of 
incentive mechanisms for data controllers. Currently, data breaches or violations of specific 
policies (e.g. COPPA) result in monetary penalties. Yet, some have argued that these penalties 
do not go far enough to ensure consumer data protection. Thus, we ask whether other incentives 
may help generate a pro-privacy stance among such companies. One avenue may be in the 
proliferation and adoption of the “public-benefit corporation” status. State chartered, this status 
allows for corporations to allow a public benefit, in this case privacy, to be part of its charter 
purpose in addition to maximizing profits. The idea is to increase transparency and 
accountability of the company’s efforts to protect said benefit to its customers and shareholders.  
On October 23, 2014, the “ad-free and never sell users’ data” social networking startup, Ello, 
formalized its status as a b-corporation in what they noted was “the strongest legal terms 
possible”.77 This is a promising first step for other companies that seek to prioritize the protection 
of consumer data as part of their main service offerings. Yet, whether this will impact the 
business’s bottom line or increase the user base remains unclear. Though, as consumers become 
more data literate, such distinctions should inform purchasing decisions. More importantly, such 
policies should encourage more transparent, open data practices. To ensure the viability of this 
recommendation, it is first worth conducting a cost analysis for both the state and for the 
company in consideration.   
In addition to an alternative corporate structure, policymakers and companies need to re-evaluate 
their understanding of personally identifiable information. First, as we’ve outlined above, all data 
(particularly in the cloud) should be considered to be the primary asset. Second, a plethora of 
research over the past decade has significantly challenged the boundaries of de-anonymization, 
thus complicating any formal definition of PIIs as outdated. However, like Schwartz and Solove, 
we too consider wholly discarding PIIs as a misstep. Instead, as they propose in their PII 2.0 
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model, privacy should be considered on a “continuum that begins with no risk of identification at 
one end, and ends with identified individuals at the other”.78 In many ways, this allows for 
specific contexts and events to help determine the sensitivity of particular data. For example in 
medical use cases that may include third-party mobile applications, understanding the privacy 
spectrum for the data in use helps frame the legal safeguards that may need to be triggered.  
 
From the Business Owners 
The Article concerns itself with the data management flow between two specific entities: the 
cloud service provider and users. For our purposes, we have limited the “user” or data-controller 
definition to include developers, start-ups, small business owners etc. We, therefore, assume a 
level of technical proficiency and skill-set from the user. As such, we urge these users - small 
business developers - to create and initiate the following steps (based or discussions above): 
generate a threat model and share a blueprint in a layman format in addition to the ToS 
agreement.  
Above we offered the followings questions to ask as one begins their modeling: What types of 
attacks need to be modeled in a cloud environment? What does threat modeling mean for a cloud 
platform? What tools and technologies be used to accomplish the modeling task? and, Will threat 
modeling help in creating an insurance plan when a data breach takes place? After creating this 
model, we advocate that business owners share their models with their users. This would serve as 
a supplemental document to the ToS agreement, which outlines specifics of the data management 
flow. A second document should also be provided that discusses insurances against data breaches 
or mismanagement of data. We equate such an approach to a landlord with multiple tenets. Each 
tenet receives documentation of the property that highlights certain types of information, like the 
security of an area and liability for lost or damaged property. By adopting these practices, both 
CSPs and data controllers are clear about their data practices from data sharing, to reselling, to 
storage, to withdrawal, to deletion, etc. We believe that the onus lies on these entities to build 
and gain user trust; and that users should demand nothing less than this level of transparency. 
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CONCLUSION 
The technology section presented a technical recommendation that suggests threat modeling of 
the cloud platform and remedial actions as a complimentary solution to existing defense 
mechanisms. A layman version of the threat scenario of the cloud is suggested be shared with the 
user for transparency purposes. The next section then offered suggested pro-user management 
practices and internal polices to supplement the technology solution. This includes the 
development of a blueprint of threat modeling of the cloud infrastructure. The section on 
complicating privacy policies and the cloud discussed current legal privacy issues in relation to 
the cloud and highlighted shortcomings of current information privacy policies. 
In light of these discussions, we turn our attention towards recommendations and additional 
points of interest that we promote will aide in securing personal data in the cloud. First and 
foremost, while technologies like strong encryption may be sufficient in protecting sensitive 
data, they are not the complete solution. What happens when data is breached? Who is held 
accountable and liable? What happens when the government wants the data for an 
investigation? Therefore, internal management policies and legal standards are needed. 
In light of these discussions, we turn our attention towards recommendations and additional 
points of interest that we promote and will aide in securing personal data in the cloud. First and 
foremost, while technologies like strong encryption may be sufficient in protecting sensitive 
data, they are not the complete solution. What happens when data is breached? Who is held 
accountable and liable? What happens when the government wants the data for an 
investigation? Therefore, internal management policies and legal standards are needed. Thus far, 
the Article has primarily focused on the CSP to data-controller business relationship. 
Unfortunately, even at this level, the data management flow in the cloud is complex. As others 
and we have stated, multi-tenet, multi-directional flows on the cloud complicate legal 
protections. How then can we move forward?  
From an internal management perspective, one point of interest is the latest decision by Apple, 
Inc. to explicitly ban its developers from reselling health data collected using its HealthKit API 
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to advertising platforms, data brokers or information resellers.79 Apple will, however, allow 
developers to share health data (with user consent) with third parties for “medical research 
purposes”. Since its announcement, several questions have already emerged: will this encourage 
consumers to share more of their personal health data? How will this be appropriated 
internationally? For our purposes, we ask whether Apple’s move helps fill in the gaps of HIPAA, 
which currently only bars private entities, like health providers and insurance companies, from 
communicating patient information to third parties.  
Could Apple’s decision set the tone for future technology data practices for all companies? While 
we wait to see if others follow suit, we encourage policy makers and civil society to continue 
efforts on to better structure current policies and statutes. 
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